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SECURITY DEVICES
Thomas A. Harrell*
ASSIGNMENT OF ACCOUNTS
In Bossier Bank & Trust Company v. Natchitoches Development
Co.,' the defendant, a general contractor on a low income housing
project, subcontracted a portion of the work to Tecton, Inc. The
subcontract apparently contained the customary provisions for
''progress payments" pursuant to which the subcontractor would be
paid a portion of the contract price as it completed specified stages
of the work, with the contractor retaining part of the price until
satisfactory completion of the entire work. Tecton had previously
agreed to assign its accounts to secure loans to be made by the plain-
tiff bank. Notice that such assignments were contemplated had been
filed as required by the Louisiana Assignment of Accounts Receiva-
bles Law.2 Tecton thereafter completed the first stages of its contract
and became apparently entitled to receive a portion of the contract
price. It then specifically assigned this "account" to the bank. The
bank served a written notice of the assignment upon the defendant
and, at the bank's request, a representative of the defendant signed
and returned a copy of the notice in which he not only acknowledged
receipt of the notice but expressly confirmed the correctness of the
amount assigned, acknowledged that the amount was then due to
Tecton and affirmed that the account "now owed" to Tecton would
be paid to the bank. Shortly thereafter it was discovered that Tecton
was in serious financial straits and would be unable to complete the
work required by the subcontract. Furthermore, Tecton had failed to
pay a number of firms supplying materials to the job who were threat-
ening to file liens against the property. To prevent this from happen-
ing, the defendant paid a number of the claimants (including one who
actually filed such a privilege) and agreed with Tecton to the cancel-
lation of the subcontract. The defendant refused to pay the assigned
claim to the bank and the latter filed suit to collect it. The contractor
defended on the ground that the type of indebtedness involved was
not an "account" but an obligation arising out of a written contract
and was therefore not within the purview of the Louisiana Assign-
ment of Accounts Receivables Act and that it was in any event enti-
tled to "offset" against the claim assigned to the bank the debts of
Tecton to the suppliers of materials whom it had paid to prevent
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 272 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
2. LA. R.S. 9:3101-10 (Supp. 1964).
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privileges from being filed against the property.
The court, in response to the first argument, held the definition
of an "account" as contained in the Act clearly comprehends not only
accounts receivable in the classic sense, but any obligation or indebt-
edness arising out of the business, profession or undertaking of the
assignor except those arising out of a tort, or those evidenced by a
promissory note or other instrument creating a security right in the
indebtedness and that the type of debt involved in the case was
clearly one included within such a definition.'
The second plea was also rejected. The court held that since the
defendant had acknowledged the assignment in writing and the bank
had acted to its detriment thereon, the defendant was liable to the
bank and should not be permitted to offset against such liability
debts owed by Tecton "that defendant absorbed for business reasons
of its own."
The defendant of course committed a serious error in not only
acknowledging it had received notice of the assignment but in inde-
pendently affirming to the bank that the amount assigned was owed
and would be paid to the bank. If the decision of the court were based
solely upon the fact that there had been an independent undertaking
by the defendant to pay the amount in question to the bank, who
thereafter relied upon such undertaking to its detriment, the case
would be noteworthy primarily as an object lesson of what a debtor
whose debt has been assigned by his creditor ought not to do. How-
ever, the court seems to go further in its opinion and strongly inti-
mates that after the assignment was perfected the assignee would be
immune from any assertion by the contractor that it was released
from responsibility because of the breach of the contract by the sub-
contractor.4 This is a much more doubtful proposition. Certainly the
obligation to pay the price was dependent upon performance by the
subcontractor. The fact that it was payable in installments and that
one of these was assigned should not prevent the obligor from setting
3. Although the court properly decided this point, it would appear that the ques-
tion was in reality of no consequence since the "assignment" would undoubtedly be
valid as the pledge of a particular obligation under LA. R.S. 9:4321-23 (1950), if it did
not fall within the purview of the Accounts Receivable Law.
4. The court does not clearly articulate its views concerning this aspect of the case.
For some reason not apparent in the opinion, the contractor did not argue that the
breach of contract by Tecton excused it from performance but instead the contractor
argued it was entitled to "offset" the claims of the materialmen against what it owed
Tecton. The court rejected this claim partly on the basis of R.S. 9:3102 which provides
that after filing of the notice of assignment "no subsequent creditor of the assignor"
shall have a right superior to the assignee and placed the lien claimants in this
category.
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up, as against the assignee, any defense he might have against the
payment arising out of a default under the contract, even though the
failure to perform occurred subsequent to the assignment. There is
but one obligation and if under the terms of the agreement between
the parties one party is not obligated to perform because of the de-
fault of the other, the assignee of the defaulting party should not have
any greater rights.'
VENDOR'S PRIVILEGE
Queen City Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Wagenwest, Inc.,' pre-
sented an interesting situation. The defendant purchased a radio
station including its equipment by an act which declared the sale was
made subject to all existing privileges and mortgages. The plaintiff
had originally sold some of the equipment to the seller and enjoyed a
vendor's privilege upon it.7 The debt was not paid and the plaintiff
attempted to assert its privilege against the equipment in the hands
of the defendant-purchaser, relying upon the statement in the act of
sale as evidencing an intention by the purchaser to recognize and
preserve the privilege. The court rejected the argument pointing out
that there is a difference between a purchaser who expressly assumes
payment of an obligation secured by a mortgage or privilege upon the
property and one who purchases by an act in which the sale is only
made subject to such claims. The court further emphasized that the
particular privilege was not identified in the sale and it could not be
said that the purchaser had specifically recognized the rights of the
plaintiff. The distinction made by the court is of course valid. A sale
made subject to a privilege or mortgage is a limitation or disclaimer
by the seller of his warranty and does not imply any promise by the
purchaser that he will satisfy the debt which it secures. However, a
privilege exists solely by virtue of the provisions of the law creating
it and the parties to a transaction cannot by contract create such a
privilege where none is given.8 Accordingly, it does not appear that a
different result would have been called for even had the purchaser
specifically recognized the existence of the particular privilege. The
5. R.S. 9:3101(1) defines an account as "any indebtedness or part thereof due to
... the assignor .. " Whether a part of a debt can be assigned without consent of
the debtor is not entirely clear, but the act seems to provide that it can.
6. 264 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
7. Plaintiff also held a chattel mortgage which was ineffective against the
defendant.
8. Econo-Car Inter., Inc. v. Zimmermann, 201 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967);
Citizens Bank v. Maureau, 37 La. Ann. 857 (1855).
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transfer of possession extinguishes a vendor's privilege upon mova-
bles and the parties cannot agree it will continue after such a trans-
fer.' Of course if a purchaser assumes the obligation secured by such
a privilege, his agreement to pay the debt is in itself part of the price
he agrees to pay for the property and would be secured by a new (and
distinct) privilege in favor of his vendor. Furthermore, the courts
have held that such an assumption is also made for the benefit of the
original creditor and may be directly enforced by him and that he is
also entitled to the benefits of any privilege so created (since he is in
substance merely enforcing the obligation stipulated in favor of the
seller). 10 In most instances this would appear to be a distinction with-
out a difference since the original obligor can enforce his debt and
enjoy a privilege against the property. However, the distinction might
be of utmost importance if the rights of third persons have intervened
during the interval between the two sales. Thus if the original pur-
chaser has placed a chattel mortgage upon the property after acquir-
ing it from his vendor, it would seem to follow that upon a sale of the
property to a new purchaser who assumes the debt to the original
vendor the chattel mortgage would then prime the vendor's privilege
securing this assumption and even, as to the original vendor, the
chattel mortgage holder's rights would constitute a superior claim
against the movable.
PLEDGE
Two cases involving the pledge of stock are worthy of passing
note. In the first" the court held that a pledgee holding stock with
blank stock powers attached, was without power to cause the stock
to be transferred to his name on the books of the corporation or to
exercise any "other rights of ownership" with respect thereto upon
default of the pledgor. The pledgee argued that R.S. 12:75(d) ex-
pressly permits such a transfer but the court rejected the argument.'I
Whether a pledgee in an act of pledge could expressly authorize such
a transfer to confirm the pledgee's rights was not discussed, but the
basis for the court's opinion would seem to preclude it. However,
under the provisions of the Civil Code the pledgee is entitled to re-
ceive, during the term of the pledge, the fruits of the thing pledged. 3
9. Dreyfous v. Cade, 138 La. 297, 70 So. 231 (1915).
10. Levy v. Desposito, 133 La. 126, 62 So. 599 (1913).
11. Emile M. Babst Co., Inc. v. Commercial Enter., Inc., 274 So. 2d 742 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1973).
12. An earlier case to the same effect, but decided prior to amendment of the
current Corporations Act is Chappuis v. Spencer, 167 La. 527, 119 So. 697 (1929).
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3168.
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It is difficult to see how the pledgee could effectively enjoy these
rights if he is not the registered owner of the stock. So long as the
pledgor remains the record owner of the stock he may vote for the
liquidation, merger or sale of the assets of the corporation, exercise
warrants received as an incident to it, and receive all dividends in-
cluding stock and ordinary dividends declared. In the case under
consideration the pledgee was obviously attempting to make a trans-
fer not for the purpose of perfecting his rights as pledgee, but to
collect the obligation for which the stock was pledged after default,
and during the time prior to the default he had apparently been
content to permit the stock to remain registered in the name of the
pledgor. The pledgee possesses only a privilege upon the thing
pledged, and the courts have quite properly struck down all attempts
by the pledgee to equate possession of the property with ownership
or to exercise the rights of an owner without following the procedures
required by law to execute upon his privilege. However, the pledge
of a credit, such as a negotiable instrument, is ordinarily not even
valid unless the pledgee is invested with the rights of the pledgor in
such a manner as to be equivalent to ownership. The fact that the
pledgee possesses such rights as to the world does not diminish his
obligations to the pledgor to act in this capacity as a fiduciary. The
transfer of stock to the name of the pledgee is not necessarily incon-
sistent with his position as a pledgee for the reasons mentioned any
more than is the case when the pledgee of a negotiable instrument is
invested with the rights of holder. An agreement specifically author-
izing such a transfer in a pledge should be valid, if it clearly regulates
the rights of the pledgee with respect to such matters as voting and
the receipt of dividends and prohibits him or at least does not permit
him to exercise such rights for his personal benefit.
In the other case 4 the pledgor of stock authorized the pledgees
in the event of default "to assign, transfer and deliver said . . .
[stock] for such considerations and on such terms as they may see
fit.""5 The pledgor defaulted and the pledgees, without notice to the
pledgor, sold the stock in accordance with the apparent terms of the
agreement. The court noted that:
Our jurisprudence is settled that in the absence of an express
waiver of the right to notice the pledgor is entitled, after demand
for and default in payment, to reasonable notice of the intention
of the pledgee to sell the pledged property. The pledgor is pre-
sumed to have waived nothing except what is specifically waived.
14. Broussard v. O'Bryan, 270 So. 2d 127 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
15. 270 So. 2d at 131.
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Smith v. Shippers' Oil Company, 120 La. 640, 45 So. 533 (1907);
Elmer v. Elmer, 203 So.2d 391 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1967); 33 Tul. L.
Rev. 59, 117.16
Since notice was not expressly waived and none was given, the sale
was held to be invalid.
Because of the obvious possibilities of abuse and in light of the
perhaps not uncommon tendency of a creditor whose debtor has de-
faulted to assume he should to be able to simply keep what has been
given to him in pledge, the courts have clearly (and correctly) an-
nounced they will hold the pledgee who has the right to sell property
by private sale to the highest degree of good faith and that they will
limit his rights to an extra-judicial sale to the clear terms of his
agreement. Both cases discussed obviously reflect this position.
Q
PRIVATE WORKS
Although the subject of laborers' and materialmens' lienes pro-
vided by R.S. 9:4801 et seq. continued to occvpy an inordinate
amount of the court's time, the cases generally contain little more
than the application of well established principles to sometimes ad-
mittedly difficult factual situations. Mention, however, should per-
haps be made of Express Ready Mix Inc. v. Evans,7 in which the
owner of an undivided one-half interest in a tract of land and who also
enjoyed the usufruct of the remaining one-half (which was owned by
her two minor children) entered into a contract for the improvement
of the property and did not require the contractor to file the contract
or give a bond. The contractor defaulted and the plaintiffs who had
delivered materials to the job filed their privileges and instituted suit
against the three owners of the property including not only the defen-
dant but also the two children. The claims against the children were
voluntarily dismissed. The lower court held the privilege and claim
invalid because the defendant was not the "owner" of the property.
On appeal the court concluded there was nothing in the act to restrict
the right of the owner of a partial interest in property from contract-
ing for its improvement and when he does so neither he, nor his
interest in the property should be permitted to escape the responsibil-
ity placed upon him if he does not cause the contractor to comply
with the recording and bonding provisions of the act. The decision of
the court seems to be the most practical and reasonable solution to
the problem and is consistent with prior jurisprudence. Certainly one
16. Id.
17. 266 So. 2d 257 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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who contracts for the construction of work upon property should not
be permitted to escape the responsibility the law places upon him by
contending that, after all, he really had no business entering into the
contract in the first place because he did not own the property he is
improving.
The dismissal of the claims against the children eliminated any
consideration of the position of the lien claimants who performed
work for the usufructuary as against the naked owners. The court
seems to consider the word "owner" as used in R.S. 9:4811 to be
equivalent to the term "owner of the usufruct." 8 However, Civil Code
articles 596 through 598 appear to make the owner of the property
subject to the usufruct (the "naked owner") responsible for repairs
done by the usufructuary and to recognize that suppliers of materials
or workmen who have performed such have a privilege upon the im-
movable, not just the usufruct, for the value of the work. Whether or
not these provisions have been superseded by the provisions of R.S.
4801 et seq. is by no means clear. It could be said that, in the case of
repairs at least, the usufructuary represents the owner and is entitled
to reimbursement from him for the cost of needful repairs. To this
extent, giving a lien would impose no greater burden on the owner
than he already has to the usufructuary. As a practical matter how-
ever, it is one thing to say that the one who improves or repairs
property should be entitled to enjoy a privilege upon it where the
usufructuary authorizes such repairs and quite another to say, as does
the Private Works Act, that personal responsibility should be im-
posed upon the owner for the price of such repairs or improvements
where he had nothing to do with the negotiation of the contract and
could not, as a practical matter, have prevented the work.
In Brunet v. Justice,"9 the court quite properly held that the
posting of a bond in lieu of the privilege under the provisions of R.S.
9:9842 does not extend the time for the lien claimant to file his suit
to establish the lien and that upon his failure to do so within one year
from the date his privilege is filed the bond can be cancelled. The
decision is correct, for the giving of the bond is at the option of the
contractor or owner and stands for the lien. Filing it should neither
enlarge nor diminish the substantive rights of the claimant.
18. This is also consistent with the provisions of R.S. 9:4811 which expressly
provides that where the work is done at the instance of one who is not the owner of.
the land he shall none the less be subject to "all of the obligations that are made
incumbent upon the owner."
19. 264 So. 2d 743 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 262 La. 1178, 266 So. 2d 451
(1972).
